Illicit drug prices and quantity discounts: A comparison between a cryptomarket, social media, and police data

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Standard

Illicit drug prices and quantity discounts : A comparison between a cryptomarket, social media, and police data. / Moeller, Kim; Munksgaard, Rasmus; Demant, Jakob.

I: International Journal of Drug Policy, Bind 91, 102969, 2021.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Moeller, K, Munksgaard, R & Demant, J 2021, 'Illicit drug prices and quantity discounts: A comparison between a cryptomarket, social media, and police data', International Journal of Drug Policy, bind 91, 102969. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2020.102969

APA

Moeller, K., Munksgaard, R., & Demant, J. (2021). Illicit drug prices and quantity discounts: A comparison between a cryptomarket, social media, and police data. International Journal of Drug Policy, 91, [102969]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2020.102969

Vancouver

Moeller K, Munksgaard R, Demant J. Illicit drug prices and quantity discounts: A comparison between a cryptomarket, social media, and police data. International Journal of Drug Policy. 2021;91. 102969. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2020.102969

Author

Moeller, Kim ; Munksgaard, Rasmus ; Demant, Jakob. / Illicit drug prices and quantity discounts : A comparison between a cryptomarket, social media, and police data. I: International Journal of Drug Policy. 2021 ; Bind 91.

Bibtex

@article{1ecf20d4f8b64eef8e206be5b5a20939,
title = "Illicit drug prices and quantity discounts: A comparison between a cryptomarket, social media, and police data",
abstract = "Background: Illicit drugs are increasingly sold on cryptomarkets and on social media. Buyers and sellers perceive these online transactions as less risky than conventional street-level exchanges. Following the Risks & Prices framework, law enforcement is the largest cost component of illicit drug distribution. We examine whether prices on cryptomarkets are lower than prices on social media and prices reported by law enforcement on primarily offline markets. Methods: Data consists of online advertisements for illicit drugs in Sweden in 2018, scraped from the cryptomarket Flugsvamp 2.0 (n = 826) and collected with digital ethnography on Facebook (n = 446). Observations are advertisements for herbal cannabis (n = 421), cannabis resin, hash (n = 594), and cocaine (n = 257) from 156 sellers. Prices are compared with estimates from Swedish police districts (n = 53). Three multilevel linear regression models are estimated, one for each drug type, comparing price levels and discount elasticities for each platform and between sellers on each platform. Results: Price levels are similar on the two online platforms, but cocaine is slightly more expensive on social media. There are quantity discounts for all three drug types on both platforms with coefficients between -0.10 and -0.21. Despite the higher competition between sellers on cryptomarkets, prices are not lower compared to social media. Online price levels for hash and cocaine are similar to those reported by police at the 1 g level. Conclusion: Mean prices and quantity discounts are similar in the two online markets. This provides support for the notion that research on cryptomarkets can also inform drug market analysis in a broader sense. Online advertisements for drugs constitute a new detailed transaction-level data source for supply-side price information for research.",
keywords = "Cryptomarket, Drug prices, Online drug sales, Risks and prices, Social media, Sweden",
author = "Kim Moeller and Rasmus Munksgaard and Jakob Demant",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 The Authors",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1016/j.drugpo.2020.102969",
language = "English",
volume = "91",
journal = "International Journal of Drug Policy",
issn = "0955-3959",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Illicit drug prices and quantity discounts

T2 - A comparison between a cryptomarket, social media, and police data

AU - Moeller, Kim

AU - Munksgaard, Rasmus

AU - Demant, Jakob

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 The Authors

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - Background: Illicit drugs are increasingly sold on cryptomarkets and on social media. Buyers and sellers perceive these online transactions as less risky than conventional street-level exchanges. Following the Risks & Prices framework, law enforcement is the largest cost component of illicit drug distribution. We examine whether prices on cryptomarkets are lower than prices on social media and prices reported by law enforcement on primarily offline markets. Methods: Data consists of online advertisements for illicit drugs in Sweden in 2018, scraped from the cryptomarket Flugsvamp 2.0 (n = 826) and collected with digital ethnography on Facebook (n = 446). Observations are advertisements for herbal cannabis (n = 421), cannabis resin, hash (n = 594), and cocaine (n = 257) from 156 sellers. Prices are compared with estimates from Swedish police districts (n = 53). Three multilevel linear regression models are estimated, one for each drug type, comparing price levels and discount elasticities for each platform and between sellers on each platform. Results: Price levels are similar on the two online platforms, but cocaine is slightly more expensive on social media. There are quantity discounts for all three drug types on both platforms with coefficients between -0.10 and -0.21. Despite the higher competition between sellers on cryptomarkets, prices are not lower compared to social media. Online price levels for hash and cocaine are similar to those reported by police at the 1 g level. Conclusion: Mean prices and quantity discounts are similar in the two online markets. This provides support for the notion that research on cryptomarkets can also inform drug market analysis in a broader sense. Online advertisements for drugs constitute a new detailed transaction-level data source for supply-side price information for research.

AB - Background: Illicit drugs are increasingly sold on cryptomarkets and on social media. Buyers and sellers perceive these online transactions as less risky than conventional street-level exchanges. Following the Risks & Prices framework, law enforcement is the largest cost component of illicit drug distribution. We examine whether prices on cryptomarkets are lower than prices on social media and prices reported by law enforcement on primarily offline markets. Methods: Data consists of online advertisements for illicit drugs in Sweden in 2018, scraped from the cryptomarket Flugsvamp 2.0 (n = 826) and collected with digital ethnography on Facebook (n = 446). Observations are advertisements for herbal cannabis (n = 421), cannabis resin, hash (n = 594), and cocaine (n = 257) from 156 sellers. Prices are compared with estimates from Swedish police districts (n = 53). Three multilevel linear regression models are estimated, one for each drug type, comparing price levels and discount elasticities for each platform and between sellers on each platform. Results: Price levels are similar on the two online platforms, but cocaine is slightly more expensive on social media. There are quantity discounts for all three drug types on both platforms with coefficients between -0.10 and -0.21. Despite the higher competition between sellers on cryptomarkets, prices are not lower compared to social media. Online price levels for hash and cocaine are similar to those reported by police at the 1 g level. Conclusion: Mean prices and quantity discounts are similar in the two online markets. This provides support for the notion that research on cryptomarkets can also inform drug market analysis in a broader sense. Online advertisements for drugs constitute a new detailed transaction-level data source for supply-side price information for research.

KW - Cryptomarket

KW - Drug prices

KW - Online drug sales

KW - Risks and prices

KW - Social media

KW - Sweden

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85092222723&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.drugpo.2020.102969

DO - 10.1016/j.drugpo.2020.102969

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 33041184

AN - SCOPUS:85092222723

VL - 91

JO - International Journal of Drug Policy

JF - International Journal of Drug Policy

SN - 0955-3959

M1 - 102969

ER -

ID: 269760788