In "The Idea of a Social Science" and in the article "Understanding a Primitive Society" Peter Winch develops what he believes to be the implications ofWittgenstein's late philosophy for the social sciences. Inspired byWittgenstein,Winch argues for a linguistic turn. Winch's basic ontological claim is that social life is conceptually organised: it is organised by the ways in which language is used by members of social life. This claim has methodological implications: the social sciences are, according to Winch, conceptual studies, that is, they are studies of the concepts possessed by members of social life. Put differently, what Winch is saying is that the validity claims made by social scientists are dependent on or presuppose a prior understanding of the concepts of those members.Where does this leave the possibility of social criticism? In social theory, the dominant view ofWinch is that the linguistic turn provides the social sciences with essential insights into the conceptual nature of social life and into ways of studying the social. However, according to critics such as Bhaskar, Giddens and Habermas,Winch's theory represents a limited linguistic/Wittgensteinian approach to the social sciences (in some ways similar to traditions such as hermeneutics and phenomenology) that neglects (what especially Marxist approaches have been strong on) phenomena such as ideology, crisis, power and social conflict and with that the significance of a critical social science capable of addressing such phenomena. In the light of new uses ofWittgenstein within social theory and recent philosophical research on Wittgenstein (that challenge the orthodoxWinchian reception of Wittgenstein), the paper discusses the prospects of a critical social science after Wittgenstein.